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DISCLOSURE AS A STRATEGY IN
THE PATENT RACE*
SCOTT BAKER and CLAUDIO MEZZETTI
University of North Carolina
Abstract
Research firms disclose a surprisingly large amount of information to the patent
office through “targeted” disclosures, that is, disclosures intended to make the patent
office aware of potentially patentable information. Conventional wisdom holds that
these disclosures are made for defensive purposes; the disclosing firm does not itself
plan to pursue patents related to the disclosed information, so the firm discloses to
create prior art that might stop rivals from patenting. But firms have an incentive to
disclose even if they intend to pursue patent protection. The reason is that, by making
it more difficult to patent, disclosure extends the patent race. If an invention of a
certain quality would have been sufficient to qualify for patent protection before the
disclosure, after the disclosure any invention must be that much better before it will
represent a sufficient advance over the now-expanded prior art. This paper models
disclosure strategies of this sort.
I. Introduction
Research firms occasionally allow their employees to make presentations
at conferences, contribute articles to peer-reviewed journals, or both. Such
activities unavoidably reveal some otherwise proprietary research informa-
tion, but they are nevertheless easy to understand. The disclosures involved
are typically small scale; they reward employees for their achievements and
also lead to favorable publicity for the firm, perhaps making it easier for it
to raise capital to fund future projects. Harder to understand are large-scale
disclosures targeted toward the patent office. We have three examples of
“targeted” disclosures in mind. First, there are the disclosures in the
publications produced by companies such as IP.com and Research Disclosure,
Inc. For a fee, these companies will place nonpatented technology in the
public domain and make it readily available to the U.S. Patent and Trademark
Office (PTO) and other patent offices worldwide. IP.com and Research Dis-
* We thank two anonymous referees and two editors for their insightful comments. This
paper owes a lot to Doug Lichtman. Doug was a coauthor of an earlier version but was unable
to devote time to this revision. For helpful comments and conversations, we thank Paul Edelman,
Rebecca Eisenberg, and workshop participants at the American Law and Economics Association
annual meeting (May 2001).
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closure, Inc., provide disclosure services for a large and diverse group of
companies.1 To show that these publications reveal valuable information,
note that the publication of Research Disclosure, Inc., is often referenced in
later-granted U.S. patents.2
Second, IBM published a technical journal from 1958 until 1998.3 Like
the publication of Research Disclosure, Inc., the IBM journal revealed val-
uable information—its articles have been cited over 48,000 times in U.S.
patents.4 IBM distributed its journal to patent offices at no fee.
Third, from February 1, 1976, through April 7, 1997, the Xerox Corpo-
ration published a bimonthly technical journal in which firm employees de-
scribed in detail their ongoing research.5 The journal was then distributed to
libraries and patent offices worldwide at no fee.
At the outset, it is important to focus on the type of disclosures considered.
Although interesting, we do not set out to explain why firms disclose po-
tentially patentable information to other competitors, the public generally, or
the capital markets.6 Instead, we focus our attention on why firms reveal
1 IP.com provides disclosure services for, among others, Abbott Laboratories, Armstrong
World Industries, Avery Dennison Carrier, ChevronTexaco, Eastman Kodak, General Electric
(GE), IBM, International Fuel Cells, Kimberly-Clark, Motorola Corporation, NCR Financial
Solutions Group, Ltd., Nippon Soda Co., Ltd., ON Semiconductor, Otis Elevator, Plantronics,
Inc., Polaroid Corporation, PPG Industries, Inc., Pratt & Whitney, Pratt & Whitney—Canada,
Square D Company, and United Technologies Research Center. See IP.com, About IP.com
(2005) (http://ip.com/about.jsp?idpaffiliates). The list of clients for Research Disclosure, Inc.,
is even more extensive; it claims that “[o]ver the years an estimated 90% of the world’s leading
companies and corporations have published disclosures in RD.” See Research Disclosure, Why
Leading Companies Use Research Disclosure (2003) (http://www.researchdisclosure.com/
overview/company.html).
2 Our search revealed that this publication has been cited 5,894 times in granted patents.
We came by this information by doing the appropriate search in the Delphion database (available
to subscribers at http://delphion.com). IP.com is a relatively recent player in the disclosure
market. Hence, its publication has not yet been cited in later-filed patent applications.
3 IBM’s journal was called the IBM Technical Disclosure Bulletin. Although IBM no longer
publishes this journal, it does continue to publish a variety of periodic research reports.
4 We searched http://www.delphion.com/search-prior_art (subscribers only). According to
IBM spokesmen, the bulletin is the third most frequently cited nonpatent reference in U.S.
patent applications. See Pryor Garnett, The Case for Defensive Disclosure (remarks given at
the Software Patent Institute organizational conference, July 22–23, 1991) (excerpted at http://
www.spi.org/defdis.htm). Our own search at the Patent and Trademark Office Web site revealed
over 7,000 separate patents citing the bulletin in just the last 5 years.
5 The publication was called the Xerox Disclosure Journal. A spokeswoman for Xerox
provided the dates of publication; further information about this publication is available online
from New Jour at http://gort.ucsd.edu/newjour/x/msg00749.html. Xerox now makes its disclo-
sures through IP.com. According to the spokeswoman, Xerox released 50 publications in 2003
and planned to release 50 publications in 2004. It is interesting to note that Xerox does not
list its name on the disclosures through IP.com; they are anonymous (Xerox spokeswoman,
telephone conversation with Baker, September 29, 2004).
6 On using disclosure to attract capital, see Sudipto Bhattacharya & Jay R. Ritter, Innovation
and Communication: Signalling with Partial Disclosure, 50 Rev. Econ. Stud. 331 (1983).
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information to the PTO itself.7 In addition to the publicity and reward ra-
tionales, there are a host of other reasons why a firm might place potentially
patentable information in the public domain. For example, a firm might reveal
information to actual or potential competitors in order to discourage com-
petition in the disclosing firm’s line of research—by, for instance, showing
that the disclosing firm is very far down the research path or that its research
is of a high quality. This explanation resonates; it cannot explain, however,
why firms try so hard to make the PTO aware of their disclosures. After all,
if discouraging competition were the motivation, then a firm would target
its disclosures at competitors and potential competitors—not the PTO.
Alternatively, a firm might disclose to a broad technological audience,
hoping that someone in that audience might build on the disclosure and break
down a technological barrier that the disclosing firm cannot solve. This
justification also makes sense, and it explains, perhaps, why firms sometimes
engage in large public disclosures. Again, however, this rationale fails to
explain disclosures directed at the PTO.8 What, then, is the reason for targeted
disclosures? Certainly, these disclosures have some impact on the patenting
process; otherwise, firms would not bother.9
In assessing the impact of targeted disclosures, patent attorneys typically
say that these disclosures are defensive in nature. What they mean is that
the disclosures are designed to preempt patents in instances in which the
disclosing firm does not itself plan to pursue patent protection but fears that
its rivals might. The logic is as follows. In all of the world’s patent systems,
patent applications are evaluated in light of the prior art, and patents are
issued only in instances in which an alleged invention is a sufficient advance
over that prior art. Firms such as IBM and Xerox increase the scope of the
7 On its Web site, Research Disclosure, Inc., advertises its service as facilitating disclosures to
patent examiners. See Research Disclosure, Overview (2003) (http://www.researchdisclosure
.com/overview/index.html) (“You just send us the invention details you wish to disclose, and
we publish them in both our paper and electronic RD formats. We charge you a modest one
off fee and that is it. You can then rest assured that the patent examiners will see it for decades
to come while you concentrate on developing your invention.”)
8 There are a number of other possible reasons why firms might publish valuable information.
A firm, for instance, might disclose some irrelevant bit of information to mislead competitors
about the direction of the disclosing firm’s research agenda. Alternatively, a firm might offer
a publication reward for employees who comply with the firm’s confidentiality policy and
submit their work for review. Similar to the reasons mentioned above, these justifications fail
to explain the disclosures at issue here, that is, disclosures intended to make the patent office
aware that potentially patentable information is already in the public domain. We thank a
referee for bringing to our attention many of the reasons for disclosure previously discussed.
9 Note that making the PTO aware of disclosures entails a nontrivial cost. For example,
IP.com customers pay $155 to have their first set of disclosures turned into prior art (for each
additional publication, IP.com offers a quantity discount). See IP.com, Prior Art Database:
Rates/Fees (2005) (http://ip.com/pad/priorArtDatabase.jsp?idppriorartdb_rates). Research Dis-
closure, Inc., charges less, $120, for each manuscript page submitted for publication. See
Research Disclosure, Disclosure Rates (2003) (http://www.researchdisclosure.com/publish/
dasr.html). It is hard to know the costs IBM and Xerox faced in making their journals freely
available to the patent office.
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prior art when they disclose. Hence, disclosure can serve a defensive purpose:
disclosure makes it more difficult for rivals to patent inventions related to
the disclosed information.
When might a firm engage in this sort of defensive maneuver? One typical
setting would be an instance in which the firm prefers state trade secret
protection over federal patent protection. In such an instance, the firm might
defensively disclose, revealing enough information to thwart rival patents
but, beyond that, keeping its research secret. Another typical setting would
be one in which the disclosing firm doubts that its research will ever lead
to a profitable commercial product. In that case, defensive disclosure allows
the firm to avoid the cost of applying for a patent but nevertheless keeps
rivals from acquiring exclusive rights—just in case circumstances change
and the disclosing firm decides to return to this line of research.
These standard articulations of defensive disclosure resonate; certainly
large-scale disclosures are sometimes made in instances in which the dis-
closing party is not seeking patent protection and the disclosure is thus simply
designed to thwart rival patent applications.10 But a close look at recent
patenting behavior by Xerox and IBM suggests that this explanation may be
incomplete. After all, between 1996 and 2001, there were nearly 150 patents
issued in which Xerox had to cite its own journal as prior art against a patent
application filed on behalf of the firm.11 For IBM, during that same time
span, the number of self-citations exceeds 2,300—or, to put it into perspective,
includes nearly one of every six patents assigned to IBM in those years.12
And while self-citations might simply be evidence of a change in the relevant
firm’s research focus—deciding to abandon a project one year, then reversing
that decision years later—in many of these applications, the publication of
the journal article is remarkably close in time to the filing of the patent
application.13 The dates’ proximity suggests that these firms are not simply
10 Another possible reason exists for disclosing to the PTO, one not emphasized in the
literature or considered in the model. A firm might disclose in cases in which there is a dearth
of prior art and, in effect, educate the PTO about a certain technology. In so doing, the firm
can establish what the prior art is. This, in turn, might enable the disclosing firm to use the
now-established prior art to prove that a future innovation is nonobvious. Again, we thank a
referee for bringing this possible reason for disclosure to our attention.
11 The number quoted in this sentence comes from an electronic search of the U.S. Patent
and Trademark Office’s archive of issued patents. For patents issued between January 1, 1996,
and July 17, 2001, there were 362 citations to the Xerox Disclosure Journal, 139 of which
came on patents assigned back to Xerox itself. The total number of patents assigned to Xerox
during this time period was 4,962.
12 More specifically, for patents issued between January 1, 1996, and July 17, 2001, there
were 9,066 citations to the IBM Technical Disclosure Bulletin, 2,316 of which came on patents
assigned to IBM. The total number of patents assigned to IBM during the time period was
13,854.
13 Some representative examples include U.S. Patent No. 6,256,775 (application assigned to
IBM, filed in 1997, citing a 1996 article from IBM Technical Disclosure Bulletin as limiting
prior art); U.S. Patent No. 6,253,279 (again assigned to IBM, filed in 1998, citing a 1995
article from IBM Technical Disclosure Bulletin); U.S. Patent No. 6,229,114 (assigned to Xerox,
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reacting to changing research priorities. Instead, the close dates of the self-
citations are consistent with firms knowingly publishing information about
ongoing research projects.14
In this paper, we therefore set out to provide an alternative explanation
for why, as part of their formal intellectual property strategies, research firms
intentionally disclose sensitive information to the PTO. Our basic insight is
that firms have reason to disclose even in cases in which they still plan to
pursue patents related to the disclosed information. The conventional wisdom
does not fully capture the potential advantages of disclosure; it is not merely
some spoiler strategy played by firms that expect to exit a given patent race.
Disclosure can, in addition, be a rational strategy for firms that plan to continue
racing.
The intuition is straightforward. Because patents are evaluated in light of
the prior art, disclosures by one firm make it more difficult for any firm to
claim a related patent. Disclosure in essence extends the race.15 If an invention
of a certain quality would have been sufficient to qualify for patent protection
before the disclosure, after the disclosure the invention must be that much
better before it will represent a sufficient advance over the now-expanded
prior art. Our point is that a firm actively engaged in a patent race might
very well have an incentive to extend the race. For a firm trailing in a given
patent race, a longer race might offer a better opportunity to catch up. For
a firm leading a given patent race, extending the race raises the costs of
racing, a strategy that will in certain instances discourage the laggard from
racing so aggressively.16
In short, this paper offers a fuller account of the reasons for disclosure.
Conventional accounts stress that disclosure can benefit a firm that does not
filed in 1999, citing a 1991 article from Xerox Disclosure Journal). A fuller case study of
IBM’s citations to its own journal is presented in Section IV.
14 This point has not been stressed by patent practitioners, policy makers, and even industry
insiders. Typically, they describe disclosure’s strategic value as arising when, at the time of
disclosure, the disclosing firm does not itself plan to pursue patent protection. This is the logic
put forward in the materials advertising services related to disclosure (see, for example, http:
//www.ip.com/about.jsp?idpprotectInnovation). This is also the logic typically used to explain
the Statutory Invention Registration (52 U.S.C. § 157), a federal program that helps firms
disseminate information about unpatented inventions. See, for example, U.S. Department of
Commerce, Patent and Trademark Office, Statutory Invention Registration, 64 Fed. Reg. 66,170,
66,170 (November 24, 1999) (explaining that Statutory Invention Registration is useful to
parties who do “not want to go through the effort and expense of obtaining a patent on the
invention” but “[at] the same time, . . . [want] to prevent someone else from later obtaining
a patent on a like invention.”).
15 For a disclosure to extend the patent race, it must affect the threshold of patentability. To
do this effectively, the PTO must be aware of the disclosure. This is why it is so important
that the PTO know about the disclosure.
16 In formalizing this point, we incorporate within a more general framework the idea that
leaders in a patent race can use disclosure to reduce the expected value of the patent for the
laggard in the race. See Douglas Lichtman, Scott Baker, & Kate Kraus, Strategic Disclosure
in the Patent System, 53 Vand. L. Rev. 2175, 2205–7 (2000) (discussing how a leading firm
might use disclosure to reduce the expected value of the patent to the laggard).
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itself seek patent protection; our account shows that disclosure can in addition
benefit a firm that is in fact seeking patent protection.17 We proceed as follows.
Section II presents our model of disclosure in the context of a patent race.
In Section III, we show that disclosure can be attractive to firms engaged in
a patent race, and we show how the incentive to disclose varies with changes
in the legal rules and firm attributes. Section IV presents supportive empirical
evidence—namely, a case study of IBM’s disclosure practices as evidenced
by patents issued between January 1, 1996, and July 17, 2001. Finally, Section
V concludes, providing one possible extension and showing how our work
fits within the general debate over the proper scope of the prior-art rules and
the effectiveness of the patent prosecution process.
II. The Model
Our model draws on three related literatures. First and most obviously,
this is a patent race model, and in structuring it we clearly benefited from
the existing literature on patent races; Jennifer Reinganum18 provides a helpful
survey. Second, the literature on knowledge spillovers suggested to us several
ways to model transfers of knowledge between firms. This literature originally
focused on inadvertent transfers of knowledge, but recent contributions such
as those by Giovanni De Fraja19 and James Anton and Dennis Yao20 consider
the possibility of intentional spillovers, a modeling problem very similar to
our own. Third, several papers on strategic disclosure helped us to understand
the strengths and limitations inherent in a variety of possible modeling ap-
proaches. In specific, while not containing formal models, the text discussions
in papers by Gideon Parchomovsky21 and Rebecca Eisenberg22 outlined sev-
eral ways of articulating pure spoiler strategies. Along related lines, a recent
paper by Oren Bar-Gill and Parchomovsky23 shows that firms might disclose
17 Interestingly, both explanations fit within the more general framework of strategies in
which a firm attempts to raise its rival’s costs. In the traditional explanation, this has only a
negligible effect on the disclosing firm’s own costs since the firm is assumed not to be pursuing
patent protection. In our explanation, by contrast, disclosure does increase the disclosing firm’s
costs but nevertheless benefits the disclosing firm in certain cases. There is a large industrial
organization literature on strategies of this sort. See, for example, Steven C. Salop & David
T. Scheffman, Raising Rivals’ Costs, 73 Am. Econ. Rev. Papers & Proc. 267 (1983).
18 Jennifer Reinganum, The Timing of Innovation: Research, Development, and Diffusion,
in 1 Handbook of Industrial Organization 849 (Richard Schmalensee & Robert Willig eds.
1989).
19 Giovanni De Fraja, Strategic Spillovers in Patent Races, 11 Int’l J. Indus. Org. 139 (1993).
20 James J. Anton & Dennis A. Yao, Patents, Invalidity, and the Strategic Transmission of
Enabling Information, 12 J. Econ. & Mgmt. 151 (2003).
21 Gideon Parchomovsky, Publish or Perish, 98 Mich. L. Rev. 926 (2000).
22 Rebecca A. Eisenberg, The Promise and Perils of Strategic Publication to Create Prior
Art: A Response to Professor Parchomovsky, 98 Mich. L. Rev. 2358 (2000).
23 Oren Bar-Gill & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Value of Giving Away Secrets, 89 Va. L.
Rev. 1857 (2003).
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to weaken protection for their own patents. A weak patent, they argue, is
less likely to block other firms from recouping investment in complementary
innovations. As a result, complementary investment and innovation increase,
rendering the weak patent more valuable to the disclosing firm. Finally, from
the literature, the incomplete information model in a paper by Douglas Licht-
man, Scott Baker, and Kate Kraus24 confirmed for us that the incomplete-
information framework, while useful to show the various signaling effects
that were central to that paper, would not adequately explain why firms try
so hard to make the PTO aware of their disclosures.
Now, we turn to our model setup. Our model considers strategic disclosure
in the context of a two-firm patent race. One firm, M, begins the race with
knowledge m. The other firm, N, begins the race with knowledge n. Prior
art relevant to the race and already known to the public is represented by
the variable p. For ease of exposition, knowledge in this race is ordered in
a linear fashion. Thus, means that firm M knows everything firm Nm 1 n
knows, plus more.25 Naturally, ; in words, each firm knows atmin{m, n} ≥ p
least as much as is in the public domain.26
A patent is issued in this model whenever a given firm’s knowledge ex-
ceeds the prior art by some sufficient measure (determined by law).27 Patents
vary in their reach. Some advance prior art by only a small amount, others
by a larger extent. Patents that have a broader scope also have more value
to the firm. To capture this in the simplest way, we consider two types of
patents: narrow and broad. We denote by D the knowledge margin necessary
to obtain a narrow patent and by the margin necessary to obtain aD  b
broad patent, where b is greater than zero. We let V be the value to the firm
of a narrow patent and the value of a broad patent, where a is(1  a)V
greater than zero. As Figure 1 shows, variables m and n mark the firms’
relative positions at the start of the race, while variables p, D, and b combine
24 Lichtman, Baker, & Kraus, supra note 15.
25 This is of course a simplification. In the real world, firms can pursue different research
paths, and one firm might very well have less total information than its rival but nevertheless
know some information that its rival does not. These sorts of complexities are likely to make
disclosure more difficult. For instance, they introduce the possibility that the disclosing firm
could accidentally reveal information that its rival needs and the possibility that the disclosing
firm could reveal information only to find out later that it was completely irrelevant to (and
thus did not in any way delay) the rival’s patent application. Also, we assume that the PTO
and the competing firm observe any disclosure.
26 There is no reason to believe that having only two firms in any way distorts the results.
Having additional firms increases the need for disclosure in many cases, but it also increases
the odds that a given disclosure will inadvertently assist a rival.
27 We do not delve here into all the nuances of the prior-art rules. Interested readers are
encouraged to consult Lichtman, Baker, & Kraus, supra note 15, at 2180–89, 2197–98, for a
full discussion. One important thing to note, however, is the statutory bar for prior publications
(see 35 U.S.C.A. § 102[b]). Under this provision, a firm that publishes a result may still pursue
patent protection if it files its application within a year of the publication. If it does not file
within a year, the publication prevents patentability. We assume that if a firm chooses to disclose,
it cannot, then, seek patent protection for the disclosed knowledge.
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Figure 1.—Basic race structure
to determine the threshold of patentability. Note that only one firm can win
any given patent. In our setting, the patent will go to the first firm to achieve
total knowledge of at least . The interesting case to consider is the onep  D
in which , so at the beginning of the race no firm is in amax{m, n} ! p  D
position to win without acquiring some additional knowledge.
Most patent race models focus on the process through which firms gain
knowledge and move closer to earning the patent. Conventional models, in
other words, focus on changes to variables such as m and n. What is inno-
vative about our model is that we consider changes to p as well. Firms in
our model are allowed to disclose information to the PTO, thereby increasing
p and raising the threshold of patentability, . This gives the firms whatp  D
can fairly be described as a unilateral right to extend the race. The only
constraint is that a firm can extend the race only if it has relevant knowledge
to disclose.
We will focus on a sequence of moves in three periods. As will become
clear, it takes three periods to capture the core disclosure interaction. A smaller
number of periods offers no real incentive for disclosure by either firm. A
larger number of periods, by contrast, makes the model more complicated
without adding any important new insight.
In the first period, firm M conducts research, earns an increment of knowl-
edge, and then either wins the patent or makes a disclosure. Firm M can
choose to disclose any amount of information, ranging from nothing to its
full knowledge. In the second period, it is firm N’s turn to conduct research,
increase its knowledge, and then either win the patent or make a disclosure.
Finally, in the third period, M conducts research once more, acquiring knowl-
edge, and again either winning the patent or making a disclosure. It is im-
portant to note that any knowledge that is strategically disclosed by a firm
cannot be patented in the future.28 This is because disclosed knowledge
becomes prior art, and a patent is won only if a firm produces a minimum
knowledge increment over prior art (D for a narrow patent and for aD  b
broad patent).
The allure of this three-period model is that disclosure, if it happens at
all, will happen only in the first period. Think, for example, about the third
28 This is subject, of course, to the qualification about the statutory bar discussed earlier.
See note 26 supra.
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period. Firm M has no reason to disclose in the third period since the game
ends there regardless. In the second period, firm N similarly has no reason
to disclose. After all, if N has not won the patent by the end of the second
period, N has no chance of winning later in the game (it has no moves left)
and thus has nothing to gain from disclosure.29 So the first period is the heart
of the three-period disclosure model. If firm M does not itself win the patent
in the first period, M might disclose in the hope that a disclosure will decrease
firm N’s chance of winning in the second period and thereby increase the
chance that firm M will have the opportunity to try again in the third period.
III. Results
We can solve for firm M’s optimal disclosure strategy in the first period.
Suppose that, in the first period, firm M draws a random increment of knowl-
edge (call it ) from some distribution , where .k F(7) F(k) p prob(k ≤ k)m m
In words, is the probability that M’s draw in this period will be lessF(k)
than or equal to k. If that knowledge puts M over the patentability threshold,
the game will immediately end.30 If not, however, firm M has to make a
decision about disclosure.
In making its decision about disclosure, firm M must consider the fact
that, in the next period, firm N will get a knowledge draw and will itself
have a chance to win the patent. In particular, firm N will draw a random
increment of knowledge (call it ) from a distribution , where ,k G(7) G(7)n
like , is simply a distribution of the form . Note thatF(7) G(k) p prob(k ≤ k)n
there is no specific relationship between and . So, for example, ifF(7) G(7)
firm M has a better research staff than does firm N, will on averageF(7)
yield higher knowledge draws than . Conversely, if N has the betterG(7)
scientists, will tend to yield better knowledge draws than .31G(7) F(7)
Using these variables, we can now calculate the specific probabilities af-
fecting M’s disclosure decision. Define d to represent the size of firm M’s
disclosure in the first period. A disclosure of size d increases the level of
the prior art from p to . Naturally, d cannot be less than zero since Mp  d
cannot make a negative disclosure, and d cannot be more than m  k  pm
29 To be precise, it is also true that firms M and N do not have anything to lose from
disclosing in the second and third periods; however, it would be sufficient to add a small cost
to disclosure—a reasonable assumption—to make “no disclosure” strictly dominant. See the
cost data in note 9 supra. For this reason, we will consider only the case in which firms do
not disclose in periods 2 and 3.
30 Here we focus on the case in which firm M prefers to obtain a narrow patent in period
1, if it can, as opposed to waiting until period 3 in the hope of obtaining a broad patent but
risking that firm N wins the patent in period 2. For sufficiently small values of D or a, this
will be the case. More precisely, a sufficient condition is . See note 31 infra1 1 G(D)(1  a)
for a derivation of this condition.
31 For technical reasons that will become clear later, we assume that the distributions F and
G have logconcave densities f and g.
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since, at most, M can disclose everything it knows that is not already publicly
known.
Define to be firm N’s “knowledge threshold”; that is, is the minimumw wn n
knowledge draw that firm N needs to win the (narrow) patent. Since N will
win the patent if its knowledge satisfies the inequality
max{n, p  d}  w ≥ p  d  D,n
we know that
w p min{D, p  d  D  n}.n
Note that the probability that firm N will fail to win the patent in period 2
is and the probability that firm N will win the patent is .G(w ) 1  G(w )n n
Similarly, define to be the minimum knowledge draw that M will needwm
to win a narrow patent in period 3 (firm M’s “knowledge threshold”). Firm
M will win a narrow patent if
p  d  D  b ≥ m  k  w ≥ p  d  D,m m
and thus
w p p  d  D  m  k . (1)m m
Clearly, is the minimum knowledge draw that M will need to win aw  bm
broad patent in period 3. If firm N fails to win in the second period, then the
probability that firm M will win a narrow patent in the third period is simply
, while the probability that it will win a broad patent isF(w  b)  F(w )m m
.1  F(w  b)m
If firm M fails to win the narrow patent in the first period (that is, if
), M will choose a disclosure to maximize the product of twok  m ! p  Dm
terms: the probability of firm N losing in the second period and the expected
value of winning the patent in the third period. In the language of the model,
M will attempt to choose d so as to maximize
G(w )[V(1  F(w ))  aV(1  F(w  b))], (2)n m m
subject to the constraints and .32 Note that as long asd ≥ 0 d ≤ m  k  pm
or , disclosure is a double-edged sword in equation (2):p  d ! n d ! n  p
it increases the odds that firm N will lose in the second period (good for M),
but it also decreases both the odds that firm M will win and the odds that
it will obtain a broad patent in the third period (bad for M). Note, too, that
the optimal level of disclosure will never be greater than becaused* n  p
firm M has no incentive to raise the level of the prior art above firm N’s
32 Suppose that firm M can obtain a narrow patent, but not a broad one, in period 1; the
payoff from a narrow patent is V. The payoff from waiting until period 3, in the hope of
obtaining a broad patent, is , which is bounded above byVG(w ) [1  a (1  F (w  b))]n m
, since . Hence, implies that firm M will file for a narrowVG (D) (1  a) w ≤ D 1 1 G(D)(1  a)n
patent in period 1 instead of waiting.
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knowledge level. Doing so, after all, would hurt M without in any way harm-
ing N; that is, it would reduce without increasing .33 Thus, we1  F(7) G(7)
can rewrite as follows:wn
w p p  d  D  n. (3)n
We can now state and prove five propositions that capture the basic re-
lationships between strategic disclosure and the six model parameters m, n,
p, D, a, and b. We will explain the intuitions behind these propositions
below.
Proposition 1. The disclosing firm’s optimal level of disclosure in-
creases with m, the knowledge of the disclosing firm. This is true no matter
whether the disclosing firm leads or trails in the race.
Proposition 2. The disclosing firm’s optimal level of disclosure in-
creases with n, the knowledge of the rival firm. This is true no matter whether
the disclosing firm leads or trails in the race.
Proposition 3. The disclosing firm’s optimal level of disclosure de-
creases with the prior art p and with D, the distance by which narrow pat-
entable inventions must exceed the prior art. This is true no matter whether
the disclosing firm leads or trails in the race.
Proposition 4. The disclosing firm’s optimal level of disclosure de-
creases with b, the distance by which broad patentable inventions must exceed
narrow patentable inventions. This is true no matter whether the disclosing
firm leads or trails in the race.
Proposition 5. The disclosing firm’s optimal level of disclosure de-
creases with a, which is a measure of the difference in scope between a
broad patent and a narrow patent. This is true no matter whether the disclosing
firm leads or trails in the race.
Proofs. See the Appendix.
It is useful to consider as an example the case in which firms M and N
both draw knowledge k from the uniform distribution on [0, 1]. Mathemat-
ically, . In this case, equation (A6) in the Appendix, theF(k) p G(k) p k
relevant first-order condition, becomes
1  w  a  a(w  b)  w (1  a) p 0, (4)m m n
33 One may suppose that research as a function of a firm’s knowledge level exhibits decreasing
returns. This could be modeled by conditioning the distributions G and F on, respectively, the
knowledge of firm N and firm M; that is, we could write andG(7Fmax{n, p  d}) F(7Fm 
. In this case, if , then disclosure has the benefit of pushing firm N into a regionk ) p  d 1 nm
of decreasing returns; in some extreme cases, this benefit of disclosure may outweigh the cost
of increasing M’s knowledge threshold , and firm M may want to disclose more than .w n  pm
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which, when we substitute in equation (1) for and equation (3) for ,w wm n
gives us the optimal level of disclosure in the example:
1 ab
d* p 1   2p  2D  m  n  k . (5)m( )2 1  a
The intuition for propositions 3–5 is easiest to understand. Proposition 3
asserts that increases in p or D lead to decreases in disclosure. This follows
because, all else held equal, an increase in p or D makes it less likely that
firm N will win the patent. Disclosure is attractive to M only because it
decreases N’s chances of winning, so, because increases in p or D already
make N less likely to win, M’s incentive to disclose is diminished.
Propositions 4 and 5 show that an increase in either b or a also decreases
disclosure. This is because disclosure has the cost of reducing the likelihood
that firm M will be able to obtain a broad patent. By making the broad patent
more valuable, an increase in a increases this cost—without affecting the
benefit of disclosure—and thus makes firm M less willing to disclose. Like-
wise, an increase in b makes it more difficult to obtain a broad patent and
as such reduces the incentive for firm M to disclose.
Proposition 2 can be explained along similar lines. Proposition 2 asserts
that increases in firm N’s knowledge lead to increases in disclosure by firm
M. This follows because any increase in N’s knowledge increases N’s like-
lihood of winning the patent. Naturally, M responds with an additional dis-
closure in the hope of offsetting that effect.
Proposition 1 asserts that an increase in firm M’s own knowledge also
leads to an increase in disclosure. The logic here is that disclosure allows
firm M to trade increases in its own chance of winning (in period 3) for
increases in firm N’s probability of losing (in period 3). Without a change
in disclosure, an increase in firm M’s knowledge would affect only the first
of these terms; it would increase firm M’s chance of winning in the third
period, but it would not at all affect firm N’s probability of losing in the
second period. With an increase in disclosure, by contrast, firm M can spread
the effect across both terms. It can diminish its own (now increased) chance
of winning in the third period but correspondingly increase firm N’s prob-
ability of losing in the second period. The extent to which this trade-off will
benefit M depends on the specifics of each case, but, as the proposition states,
we know across all cases that firm M will never react to an increase in
knowledge by disclosing less, since that would just further skew the prob-
abilities in favor of the first term as opposed to the second.
Note that none of the above intuitions requires any specific assumption as
to whether the disclosing firm leads or lags in the race. Thus, all of the
propositions explicitly apply to both leader and laggard firms.
So far, we have assumed that if no firm gains a patent, then when the
game ends at the end of period 3, any partial knowledge acquired has no
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value. It is interesting to ask what would happen if partial progress had value.
To address this issue, suppose that if no firm gains a patent, then the firms
compete in the market, and each firm’s profit level at the end of period 3 is
an increasing function of its own knowledge and a decreasing function of
the knowledge of the other firm.34
If it is unable to win the race, at the end of period 2, firm N’s dominant
strategy is to disclose all of its knowledge up to —the present knowl-m  km
edge level of firm M. By raising the prior-art level to p p min(n  k ,2 n
, firm N lowers the probability that firm M will win the race in periodm  k )m
3 without affecting its payoff in case firm M does not win the race and the
two firms compete in the market. On the other hand, if firm N discloses
beyond firm M’s knowledge , then it decreases its payoff inm p m  k2 m
case firm M does not win the race (because it raises firm M’s knowledge)
without raising the probability that firm M will not win the race (because a
unit disclosure beyond the present knowledge level of firm M raises both
the prior art and firm M’s knowledge by 1 unit and thus does not affect the
threshold knowledge increase that firm M needs to win the race in period
3). This, in turn, means that it is not in firm N’s best interest to disclose
more than firm M already knows. Given firm N’s dominant strategy, the
minimum draw that M needs to win a narrow patent in period 3 is
w* p p  D  m . (6)m 2 2
If no firm wins the race, the levels of partial knowledge of firms M and
N at the end of period 3 are and , respectively; thus, we canm  k n  k2 3 n
denote firm M’s profit level if no firm wins the race as p (m  k , n 2 3
. If firm M fails to win in the first period, then it chooses a disclosure dk )n
to maximize
G(w )[V(1  F(w*))  aV(1  F(w*  b))]n m m
∗w wn m
 p(m  k , n  k )g(k )f (k )dk dk .
(7)  2 3 n n 3 n 3
0 0
Equation (7) depends on d only through , which is increasing in d.wn
Hence, the optimal level of disclosure by firm M in this case is d* p
, which is clearly greater than in the case in which partialmin (n, m  k )  pm
knowledge has no value. The intuition for why disclosure by firm M increases
when partial knowledge has value is clear. Since in period 2 firm N will
disclose all its knowledge up to the knowledge level of firm M, in period 1
34 We assume that a firm’s own knowledge increases its profit even if that knowledge was
previously disclosed, so long as no patent has issued. This would be true if, for example,
knowledge reduced the marginal cost of production or, alternatively, if rival firms could not
quickly take advantage of disclosed information.
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it is optimal for firm M also to disclose all its knowledge up to the knowledge
level of firm N. By doing so, firm M decreases the probability that firm N
will win the race in period 2 without affecting its payoff if firm N does not
win the race.
Our model does not allow firms to negotiate.35 If it did, one might expect
that instead of disclosing, firms would simply threaten to disclose and then
negotiate a private agreement in the shadow of that threat. These sorts of
bargains would be attractive to the firms since, unlike public disclosure, a
private agreement would not prolong the race. So, as long as the parties
could agree on how to divide the surplus generated by an earlier patent and
cheaper race, they should prefer private negotiation over public revelation.
The main reason that we do not allow private negotiations is that in many
instances such negotiations are extremely unlikely. For one thing, they would
take place under time pressure. Delay would give the nondisclosing firm
time to advance its research—perhaps enough to file for the patent and in
that way nullify the disclosure threat. The disclosing firm would thus need
to either strike a bargain immediately or abandon the negotiation and disclose.
This would exacerbate standard impediments to bargaining—for example,
disagreements as to the effect any given disclosure would have on the race.
Moreover, to whatever extent firms use disclosure as a way of undermining
a rival’s incentive to race, private negotiations seem particularly difficult.
The difficulty comes in specifying contract terms and monitoring compliance
with those terms.36
IV. Empirical Evidence
To find empirical support for our basic argument that firms publicly disclose
research information in ongoing patent races, we conducted a case study of
IBM’s research disclosures as reflected by patent citations to its most prom-
inent journal, the IBM Technical Disclosure Bulletin. Specifically, using a
database provided by the PTO, we identified the 13,854 utility patents issued
between January 1, 1996, and July 17, 2001, for which “International Busi-
ness Machines” was the patent assignee.37 Examining those electronically,
we found that 2,310 of them cite as prior art at least one article from the
35 The possibility of negotiations between firms prior to disclosure is considered in depth in
Lichtman, Baker, & Kraus, supra note 15, at 2213–16, and Parchomovsky, supra note 20, at
948–50.
36 Lichtman, Baker, & Kraus, supra note 15, at 2215, outlines these difficulties in more
detail.
37 Electronic searches were conducted using both the official patent database compiled by
the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (http://patft.uspto.gov/netahtml/search-bool.html) and a
database available by subscription from the Delphion Intellectual Property Network (http://
www.delphion.com). In both databases, our first search was for the phrase “International Busi-
ness Machines” in the “assignee” field of any utility patent.
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IBM Technical Disclosure Bulletin.38 So, in approximately one out of every
six patents issued to IBM during this time period, IBM’s own disclosures
are cited.
Standing on its own, these data do not necessarily support our thesis. One
could interpret these numbers not as evidence of the theory presented here
but instead as evidence that (often) IBM employees publish an article thinking
that the firm is abandoning a given patent race but then, years later, priorities
change and IBM resumes the relevant race. Stated differently, for the data
to be consistent with this abandonment or defensive-disclosure thesis, a sig-
nificant amount of time should have elapsed between the date of the pub-
lication and the date of the patent application. After all, a long lag would
give IBM researchers a chance to abandon a certain research and development
(R&D) agenda and then reenter when things change. If instead the publication
pertained to IBM’s active research agenda, we should observe a short lag
between publication and patent application.
Of course, it is hard to define what exactly constitutes an “active” patent
race. The idea of a patent race over a single innovation is an abstraction. In
reality, firms such as IBM pursue a variety of interrelated innovations at the
same time. Moreover, for each patent studied, we do not know—and cannot
know—how many other firms were pursuing similar innovations. Further-
more, because of the secrecy surrounding R&D programs, we cannot observe
whether firms dropped certain parts of their R&D agenda because of IBM
publications. Our qualified claim is that the empirical results presented below
are consistent with the thesis advanced in this paper and inconsistent with
the most prominent explanation—defensive disclosure—set forth by patent
attorneys and the academic literature.39
To determine the time lapse, we analyzed each of the 2,310 patents at
issue and calculated the number of months that passed between the date of
the relevant publication40 and the date on which the patent application was
ultimately filed.41 As stated, long gaps would support the idea of changed
38 Our search here was for any utility patent with the phrase “International Business Ma-
chines” in the “assignee” field and a citation to “IBM Technical Disclosure Bulletin” in its list
of prior-art references.
39 Indeed, we want to be careful not to overstate the empirical claim. Although consistent
with our thesis, self-citation is also consistent with a more mundane explanation: inventors are
familiar with the contents of their own technical journals. As a result, in providing common
background information for the patent application, an inventor might cite the technical journal
simply because that is the journal with which he or she is most familiar.
40 In the event of multiple citations, we used the date of the most recent one.
41 After analyzing over 200 patents by hand, we were able to automate the process so that
the computer would parse the full text of each patent and identify for us the relevant dates.
For most patents, the necessary dates were easy to identify since filing dates are well labeled
on all issued patents, and prior art cited in a patent typically also includes a well-labeled
reference to the date of publication. Any patents that the computer deemed unclear were
processed manually, and all results were spot-checked for accuracy.
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Figure 2.—IBM self-citation patents
research priorities. Short gaps, by contrast, are consistent with the disclosure
strategy outlined here.
For 10 of the patents, there was insufficient information to make this
calculation.42 For the remaining 2,300 patents, however, we obtained the
results shown in Figure 2. Note that we rounded the tallies so that gaps of
1–12 months were labeled as 1 year, gaps of 13–24 months were labeled as
2 years, and so on. Gaps of over 10 years are not shown in the figure but
are accounted for in Table 1.
The most important trend is simply this: in 54 percent of the cases, the
gap between IBM’s publication and its patent application is less than 5 years.
Since it would be surprising if IBM’s research agenda were to change that
quickly in so many cases, this seems to lend support to the theory underlying
the paper. It seems fair to claim that the empirical evidence is consistent
with IBM often disclosing information about patents that it is actively pur-
suing, instead of simply disclosing information relevant to races it plans to
abandon.
VI. Conclusion
The primary focus in this paper has been to offer a richer account of why
research firms disclose information to the PTO. The traditional explanation
focuses on using disclosure defensively to stop rivals from patenting when
the disclosing firm itself does not intend to patent. We propose here an alter-
42 These 10 patents gave either incomplete or inconsistent citation information, and thus we
were unable to fairly assign an accurate publication date in these rare instances.
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native explanation: that disclosure might be a strategy through which a re-
search firm can unilaterally extend the patent race and thereby gain advantage
even in a patent race it has no intention of abandoning. Our explanation is
consistent with certain elements of the evidence—for example, IBM’s dis-
closure and patent practices—that cannot be explained solely by defensive
disclosure.
Our work has other implications as well, however, and in conclusion we
thought it interesting to outline two. First, in this paper we have focused
almost exclusively on strategic disclosure as an uncooperative strategy, with
firms disclosing for the sole purpose of harming their rivals. Note, however,
that disclosure can be used in cooperative settings as well. Consider, for
example, two firms both researching the same basic invention. Obviously,
the firms could be made better off if they could coordinate their research
agendas—say, sharing early research results, slowing the pace of invention,
or agreeing to each specialize in one aspect of the invention. Enforcing this
sort of coordination by contract would be difficult, however, since any such
contract would have to specify behaviors related to a still-evolving technol-
ogy—a tricky business to be sure.43
The threat of disclosure presents a workable alternative. Indeed, just as
traditional cartels work because cooperative firms can punish uncooperative
firms simply by lowering the market price of a relevant good, in research
settings—in which the coordination relates to ongoing research and hence
43 There would also be concerns about antitrust enforcement, although, as the Department
of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission both now recognize, certain types of joint
research ventures likely benefit consumers, and so some such contracts would not lead to
antitrust challenge. See Federal Trade Commission and U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust
Guidelines for Collaborations among Competitors (April 2000) (http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/
04/ftcdojguidelines.pdf).
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there is no relevant price to lower—a similarly clear and effective penalty
is the disclosure of research information to the public. In fact, it is hard to
identify any attribute that the pricing mechanism enjoys (clear, public, ef-
fective, and unilateral) that the disclosure mechanism cannot also claim. More
broadly, then, an interesting extension to this work would be to shift the paper’s
analysis from the uncooperative settings that have been its focus to potentially
cooperative settings in which the threat of disclosure would serve as a mech-
anism to maintain cooperation among would-be cooperative partners.44
Finally, we consider how our analysis fits into the larger debate over the
scope of prior-art rules and the efficacy of the patent prosecution process.
Patents issued to firms such as Amazon (the “one-click” patent)45 and Price-
line (the reverse-auction mechanism)46 have led many commentators to worry
that the PTO cannot evaluate high-technology patents. The problem is that
most of the prior art available to patent examiners is prior art associated with
preexisting patents, and so in fields in which few patents have issued, ex-
aminers simply do not have the written, archived evidence they need to
conduct a thorough and accurate prior-art review. Compounding the problem
is the fact that patent applicants need only submit with their applications
prior art that they know about.47 There is no additional requirement that the
patent applicant conduct a detailed search of prior art. The burden of searching
prior art rests almost entirely with the patent examiner. Because of this fact,
Mark Lemley has argued that “the PTO issues many patents that would have
been rejected had the examiner possessed perfect knowledge.”48
To address this problem, scholars have advocated a variety of approaches.
Jay Kesan and Marc Banik, for instance, have recently argued that patents
should be given more favorable presumptions of validity in exchange for
more complete prior-art disclosures.49 Jay Thomas has argued that parties
should be given financial rewards for bringing forward prior art that defeats
in-process patent applications.50 Lemley takes a slightly different approach.
He contends that it makes sense for the PTO to be rationally ignorant about
44 The authors have begun to pursue this extension; see Scott Baker & Claudio Mezzetti,
Using the Threat of Disclosure to Enforce Knowledge Sharing in Joint Ventures Which Span
Multiple Innovation Markets (unpublished manuscript, Univ. North Carolina, Dep’t Econ., May
2001).
45 U.S. Patent No. 5,960,411.
46 U.S. Patent No. 5,794,207.
47 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (2002).
48 Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1495 (2001).
Notably, Lemley suggests that much relevant prior art will be hard to find because it will
consist of sales and uses by third parties. Id. at 1500. Our analysis does not tackle the interesting
strategic issues involved with creating prior art through these sorts of mechanisms.
49 Jay Kesan & Marc Banik, Patents as Incomplete Contracts: Aligning Incentives for R&D
Investment with Incentives to Disclose Prior Art, 2 Wash. U. J. L. & Pol’y 23 (2000).
50 John R. Thomas, Collusion and Collective Action in the Patent System: A Proposal for
Patent Bounties, 2001 U. Ill. L. Rev. 305.
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much prior art. More succinctly, Lemley contends that it is not cost effective
for the PTO (or anyone for that matter) to conduct a detailed search of prior
art because “ninety-five percent of patents . . . will either never be used,
or will be used in circumstances that don’t crucially rely on the determination
of validity.”51
Our analysis predicts that when patents are highly valuable, firms have an
incentive to make the PTO aware of prior art.52 In fact, because of strategic
disclosures, the PTO may make a better determination of validity in just the
subset of patents in which validity is especially important.
APPENDIX
Proofs of Propositions 1–5
Define to be the optimal level of disclosure from firm M’s perspective. Prop-d*
ositions 1–5 require us to show, in turn, that
d* ≥ 0, (A1)
m
d* ≥ 0, (A2)
n
d* d*
p ≤ 0, (A3)
D p
d* ≤ 0, (A4)
b
and
d* ≤ 0 (A5)
a
for all parameter values {p, m, n, D, a, b}. The first step in doing so is to find the
value of that maximizes the expression in equation (2). At an interior solutiond*
51 Lemley, supra note 47, at 1511.
52 The marginal benefit of disclosure depends on the value of the patent, V—it is equal to
V times the left-hand side of equation (A7). We simplified our analysis by assuming that the
marginal cost of disclosure was equal to zero. If, however, the marginal cost of disclosure is
positive, then it is easy to show that disclosure is an increasing function of V.
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( ), we have the following first-order condition:m  k  p 1 d 1 0m
w G(w )n n [1  F(w )  a  aF(w  b)]m m
d wn
w F(w ) F(w  b)m m m
 G(w )  a p 0.
(A6)
n [ ]d w wm m
We can rewrite as , where is the density associated with theG(w )/w g(7) g(7)n n
distribution . Similarly, we can rewrite the partial derivative as .G(7) F(7)/w f (7)m
It follows from equation (1) that equals one for all parameter values. Thew /dm
underlying intuition is clear: every unit of information disclosed by firm M in the
first period raises by 1 unit the minimum level of knowledge that firm M must
uncover in the third period to win the patent. The partial derivative in equationw /dn
(A6) is also equal to one. This is true because M’s optimal disclosure strategy would
never have M disclosing information that N does not already know; such disclosures
would hurt M but not hurt N. So , and equals one for the samed* ≤ n  p w /dn
reason that equals one.w /dn
Accordingly, we can now rewrite equation (A6) as
g(w )[1  F(w )  a  aF(w  b)]n m m
 G(w )[f (w )  af (w  b)] p 0.
(A7)
n m m
The left-hand side of equation (A7) defines a function F that depends on the choice
variable and (through and ) the parameters m, n, , D, a, and b. The second-d* w w km n m
order condition and equations (1) and (3) imply that




p p ≤ 0. (A9)
D p d
The next four inequalities can be derived under the assumption that the densities
and are logconcave (and that b is not too large). Logconcavity is a technicalf (7) g(7)
requirement about the shape of these densities, but it is not a particularly limiting
restriction. It guarantees that , , , and are logconcave func-F(7) 1  F(7) G(7) 1  G(7)
tions. Most familiar densities—for example, the uniform, normal, and exponential
densities—satisfy it:53
F ≥ 0, (A10)
m
F ≥ 0, (A11)
n
53 The condition also holds if the density is logistic, x2, Laplace, and for some parameters,
Weibull, gamma, and beta. See Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, Game Theory 267 (1996).
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F ≤ 0, (A12)
b
and
F ≤ 0. (A13)
a
Applying the implicit function theorem yields our desired comparative static results:
d* F/m
p  ≥ 0, (A14)
m F/d
d* F/n
p  ≥ 0, (A15)
n F/d
d* F/D F/p d*
p  p  p ≤ 0, (A16)
D F/d F/d p
d* F/b




p  ≤ 0. (A18)
a F/d
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